Getting Defensive: Excuses for the Construction of the Alaska Highway by Skillbred, Dane
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate
Journal of History, Series II
Volume 10 Article 12
2005
Getting Defensive: Excuses for the Construction of
the Alaska Highway
Dane Skillbred
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives
Part of the History Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Historical
Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information,
please contact rscroggin@scu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Skillbred, Dane (2005) "Getting Defensive: Excuses for the Construction of the Alaska Highway," Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara




Excuses for the Construction of the Alaska
Highway
Dane Skilbred
The construction of the Alaska Highway (also
referred to as the ALCAN Highway) has been regarded
as one of the greatest projects in American history.
The highway spans a distance of over fifteen hundred
miles from Dawson Creek, British Columbia to Fair-
banks, Alaska.  It was constructed during World War
II after the Japanese attacks on the Aleutian Islands,
specifically those on the ports of Dutch Harbor, Attu,
and Kiska.  These attacks are widely held to be the
direct reason for the United States government’s
decision to build the road, along with the fear that a
Japanese invasion of Alaska was imminent.  
As a challenge to this view, one must ask why a
road being built to Fairbanks, Alaska was necessary to
defend Alaska against a Japanese attack on the
Aleutian Islands.  If the Japanese invasion of Alaska
was such a looming threat, why was the road to Alaska
not extended to the coast close to the Aleutian Islands
rather than to the center of Alaska?  While it makes
some sense that the United States government would
want to bring military supplies to Alaska in a timely
fashion in an emergency, it does not make sense that
the government would attempt to do so by construct-
ing a road that leads to a part of Alaska that is far from
the area of concern.  In fact, it could be argued that
the government was discussing a road to Alaska many
years before its construction in 1943, and the “de-
fense” of Alaska was not the most important focus of
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discussion.  There were mainly economic, as well as
some political and social, reasons for constructing the
Alaska Highway that were greater factors in the
deliberation to build it than was national defense. 
The discussion on the project today seems more
concerned with how the Alaskan Highway was built,
the planning that was involved, and the social implica-
tions related to its construction, rather than the
motivations for its creation.  Historian J. Kingston
Pierce compares the military effort in the project to
that of the military in building the Panama Canal.  He
discusses the long hours without sleep that troops
spent working on it, as well as the battles with the
wilderness they had to endure.1  John Krakauer also
describes some of the effects of nature on the troops,
namely the boggy marshes that engineers had to move
through and the ice and extreme cold present in the
wintertime.2  These two authors write briefly about
hearings in Congress, but their discussion seems to be
concerned mainly with the actual construction of the
highway.  The motivation for the highway’s construc-
tion is never in question.
It seems logical that the desire for the Alaska
Highway not be in question.  The reason for it being
pushed through Congress may well have been purely
for national defense.  The national defense argument,
however, does not explain why the highway was
proposed in Congress as early as 1933.  It does not
1
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account for the fact that the proposed highway was
built not in the direction of the areas being attacked
and invaded by the Japanese, but rather significantly
to the northeast of them.  Historian M.V.  Bezeau
writes that the road was already a foregone conclusion
to help the United States economy, and the Japanese
attack on the Aleutian Islands was just enough to
legitimize the American presence in the Northwest.3
There is clearly room to challenge the view that the
U.S. built the Alaska Highway purely to defend against
a Japanese threat.
The first point of contention against the argument
for national defense is the route the army took in its
construction of the highway.  The finalized route went
through mountain ranges and swamps.  The army
argued that supplies could more readily be transported
through air force flights inland along this route where
flying conditions were better.4  However, what is
interesting is that the army was not willing to build a
highway toward southwest Alaska, where the Japanese
attacks had occurred.  Looking at the following map,
it seems quite reasonable for the army to have built a
road through the pass between the Kuskokwim Moun-
tains and the Alaska Range toward Bristol Bay as
indicated by the dashed line (roughly the last 650
miles of the chosen route is indicated by the solid line).
The mountain route would have given naval forces a
much more direct route to Dutch Harbor, and the
138 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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Aleutian Islands, than a trip from Fairbanks, through
Valdez, around the Gulf of Alaska and the southwest-
ern peninsula to the same place.  According to histo-
rian M.V. Bezeau, however, the highway was never
meant to be a supply route to the Aleutians.5
6
Beside the troubling fact that the road was not
built along the simple mountain passage toward
Bristol Bay, it did not really “shorten” the route from
the continental states to Alaska all that much.  Simply
looking at distances, one might deduce that the Alaska
Highway would not make the trip for troops and
supplies any easier.  For instance, the flying distance
3
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from Seattle to Dutch Harbor is about 2000 miles.  The
distance from Fairbanks to Dutch Harbor, however, is
about 900 miles.  It seems the idea of building a
highway that spans 1500 miles, only to connect to
another highway that spans 1500 miles, to reach a city
that falls 900 miles short of the area the U.S. military
was trying to defend would not shorten the time of
reaching it at all.7 Because the distance from the
continental United States to Dutch Harbor was not
sufficiently cut, other motivations need to be examined
to explain the construction of the Alaska Highway.
Common sense indicates that the economic impact
such a project would have on the Alaskan economy as
well as the economy of the whole United States was a
strong motivation.  For years before World War II there
had been discussion in Congress about building a
highway to Alaska.  As early as 1930, Herbert Hoover
had suggested the study of a link between Alaska and
the lower 48 states.8  The discussion of the link had
little to do with the defense of the territory at the time.
The Department of the State, in its study of the terri-
tory, felt that the road would help in the “development
of natural resources,” the “development of tourist
traffic,” and the “promotion of good will and trade
between Canada and the United States, by facilitating
travel between the two countries.”9  Any discussion of
the defense of Alaska was completely missing.  What
was important in the study, though, was the idea that
140 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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the increased output of exports from the territory
would outweigh the cost of building the road.10
Historian Kenneth Coates argues that the riches in
the Canadian Northwest were on people’s minds for
years.  At the turn of the 20th century, the Klondike
gold rush had piqued great interest, and that interest
was revived in 1920 when oil was discovered in the
Mackenzie valley of British Columbia.  The thought of
this land’s immense resources never escaped public
consciousness.11  In fact, those resources were the
main topic of conversation in the Alaska legislature’s
memorial to Congress of 1933.  The legislature wrote
a letter to be read in Congress asking them to reintro-
duce dialogue about the vast economic opportunity in
the territory of Alaska, and to initiate conversation on
a highway to Alaska.  The letter described the eco-
nomic depression occurring in the territory, and the
only emergency they seemed to cite was that of the
urgent financial problem.12  It seems the whole point of
the letter was for the Alaskan legislature to give
Congress an idea of the wealth that would be gained in
the transaction.  Save for one small paragraph about
the instability in the Far East, which did not make a
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Discussion in Congress continued to neglect the
defense argument for the better part of the next
decade.  In an address to Congress, Senator Clarence
C. Dill of Washington argued that since there was talk
of a highway through Mexico, there should be talk of
one through Canada to Alaska.14  It seemed only
logical that a road should be built connecting the U.S.
and its territories.  In fact, Senator Robert R. Reynolds
of North Carolina furthered the argument by saying,
“The greatest industry on earth is the tourist industry.
This would add to the tourist industry of America as
well as of our sister countries to the north and south,
and would create for us a warmer bond of friend-
ship.”15  Three years later in the House of Representa-
tives, Warren G. Magnuson of Washington made the
case for the opening of industry as well.  By opening
new territories, the U.S. could finally make use of the
land that they had purchased from the Russians
seventy years before.16  Magnuson continued on about
everything from population growth, to the welfare of
Alaskans and the interconnectedness of the United
States.  The whole argument, however, was based on
economics, never once mentioning defense of the
region.17  The government’s stress on the monetary
value of the Alaska Highway would be the frame for
discussion throughout the period before World War II,
rather than any argument based on defense.
142 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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Not only was the debate in Congress based on
assessment of economic opportunity, but the national
media also focused on the same frame of reference.
The New York Times portrayed the construction of the
Alaska Highway as a great financial and cultural
advantage to the whole United States.  One particular
article highlighted the possibilities for future produc-
tion in Alaska.  Alaskan miners felt that Alaska could
be a permanent settlement for Americans as well as a
place for tourists to visit.  The vast resources present
in Alaska could provide jobs for people if they had
adequate transportation to the territory.18  Even as late
as 1939, the editor ran a story that featured engineer
Donald MacDonald of Fairbanks speaking to the
economic power of the region.  He believed that the
highway was a way for people to see the wildlife and
beautiful summer settings.  It would also give miners
and farmers a chance to make new beginnings.19
Clearly the media’s center of attention was on the
markets and opportunities the Alaska Highway could
potentially open up.
The discussion in Congress of a road to Alaska
gradually changed.  Talks moved from dialogue about
the development of resources and production toward
talk of defense of the territory.  One can reasonably
deduce that since the economic argument was not
enough to convince the Congress, discussion was
forced to defense.  Historian David Remley argues that
talks in Congress were stalled until the attack on Pearl
7
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Harbor.  He says that the fear of the Japanese was
what finally pushed the governments of both the U.S.
and Canada to agree on the proposal to build the
highway.20  
Even before the attacks on American harbors, as
the international climate changed, congressmen slowly
started framing their discussion around defense of
Alaska.  Rep. Magnuson made another speech in the
Congress in October 1941, this time shifting the
discussion to defense as well as resources.  His mes-
sage was that the highway would be a “great adjunct
to the national defense,” as well as “an incalculable
factor in the development of the great resources of
British Columbia and interior Alaska.”21  In August
1941, the Alaska legislature had been making similar
statements, but played on emotion much more vividly.
In a telegram to Congress, the legislature felt that the
fall of Russia was “seemingly imminent,” and that
military presence was drastically necessary.22  While
some military advisors may have suggested the possi-
bility of an attack from Japan through Alaska, it was
not widely accepted that Alaska was an immediate
target.  The legislature used the argument that it was
completely isolated except by sea and air.  The idea
that Japan would bother conquering Alaska to reach
the continental United States when there was no route
from Alaska to the continental United States for them
144 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      23Donald MacDonald,  “Defenseless Alaska – The Ramparts
we Don’t Watch – Danger in the North – an Eye-opening Look at
a Grave but Unheeded Peril, and What can be Done About It,”
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Times, Jul 26, 1942.
to travel on seems unreasonable.  The legislature’s
claims were simply exaggerations without sufficient
evidence to support them.
Other such claims came from the engineer who just
one year previous had said the Alaska Highway would
be used mainly for tourist attractions.  In an article in
the New York Times, Donald MacDonald had argued
about the economic and social benefits of the highway.
In Liberty magazine, however, he changed his opinion
to include the necessity of a highway for defense from
hypothetical threats.23  He conjectured that a threat
might one day come, and that the United States
should protect the precious resources in Alaska.  
This sort of rhetoric was adopted by the media
around the country throughout the war period.  The
New York Times published articles in favor of the
Alaska Highway, using military reasoning for the
project.  Secretary of the Interior, Harold L. Ickes,
wrote one such article. The article argued that Alaska
provided a crossroads for many key centers around the
world, making it seem that it was the closest part of
the U.S. to almost all locations across the globe.24  He
masked his discussion of the enrichment of resources
inside the territory of Alaska with ideas that it was the
center of the world for strategic positioning.
Other reporters skirted the issue of the economy
like Ickes had.  Richard L. Neuberger of Oregon dis-
cussed the possibilities of a canal project to Alaska in
9
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to include the necessity of a highway for defense from
hypothetical threats.23  He conjectured that a threat
might one day come, and that the United States
should protect the precious resources in Alaska.  
This sort of rhetoric was adopted by the media
around the country throughout the war period.  The
New York Times published articles in favor of the
Alaska Highway, using military reasoning for the
project.  Secretary of the Interior, Harold L. Ickes,
wrote one such article. The article argued that Alaska
provided a crossroads for many key centers around the
world, making it seem that it was the closest part of
the U.S. to almost all locations across the globe.24  He
masked his discussion of the enrichment of resources
inside the territory of Alaska with ideas that it was the
center of the world for strategic positioning.
Other reporters skirted the issue of the economy
like Ickes had.  Richard L. Neuberger of Oregon dis-
cussed the possibilities of a canal project to Alaska in
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an article in 1941.  The idea in the Oregon legislature
was that this canal could provide for defense, even
though its main purpose would have been for shipping
lumber.25  He started out with the defense argument,
and then the article became a venue for discussion of
assured profit.  Neuberger extended the discussion
about the Alaska Highway in 1942, with an article
entitled “America’s Burma Road.”26  This time, the
discussion was more about defense, but again had the
hint of economic interest in the Northwest region.  The
article seemed to be a tool to rally emotion from the
American public, with the final passage about the
completion of the Alaska Highway stating:  “It will be
a great day for Donald MacDonald – and a sad one for
Hitler and Hirohito.”27  The idea was that an engineer
would be happy with the project because of its poten-
tial, and the “evil leaders” would be exposed to attack
through Alaska.  The second argument does not hold
because it would be more efficient to make a direct
path from the continental United States to Japan and
the highway never was a strategic blow to the Japa-
nese, let alone the Germans.  The protection of Alaska
was an excuse for constructing a resource highway.
If the main reason for constructing the Alaska
Highway had been for the protection of Alaska, then it
was a terrible failure.  In 1944, the Alaskan Interna-
tional Highway Commission deemed the project just
146 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      28“Calls Alaska Highway Failure,” New York Times, May 9,
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      29Theodore Strauss,  “ALCAN Road Booms Vast Untamed
Area,” New York Times, Jan 1, 1943.
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that, a failure.28  The highway commission had been
created as a subcommittee in Congress in the 1930’s.
They felt the highway did not serve the purpose that it
had set out to fulfill.  It had not ever been used to
protect the people of Alaska, and it certainly never
aided in a front against the Japanese.  
Many other observers of the project did not share
the sentiment that the Alaska Highway was a failure.
The New York Times ran articles about the success of
expeditions in the Canadian Northwest and in Alaska.
Reporter Theodore Strauss mentioned the booming
industry in the territories because of everyday discov-
eries of vast resources, even during the war.29  Others
argued that the highway might improve future rela-
tions between Alaska and Canada.  The argument was
that the highway would be mutually beneficial to both
countries after the war.30  While the sentiment may
have been that both groups would benefit equally, the
U.S. has been the primary recipient of the revenue
from the Alaska Highway.
The government, as well as some members of the
mass media, used propaganda to their advantage in
bringing Canada along to finance a highway that was
more beneficial to Americans.  There is an argument
that the U.S. government purposefully moved forward
on construction of the highway to claim a sort of
political sovereignty over Canada.  Historian Curtis R.
Nordman argues that, in order to save face, the Cana-
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dian government was forced to pay $123,500,000.31
The majority of this was for staging routes on the
Alaska Highway.  Not only that, but the Canadian
government has been forced to pay for the constant
improvements on the highway since its completion.32
While the Alaska Highway has benefited Canadians to
an extent in the post-World War II era, many see it as
a passage for Americans from the Continental U.S. to
Alaska.  The trip through the Canadian Northwest has
drawn revenue from tourists on their way to Alaska,
but the majority of their money has been spent in
Alaska.  It is as if Canada were only a stepping-stone
that the United States government had to overcome to
connect its territories.  The movement for the Alaska
Highway was just another example of Americans’
sentiment for political supremacy over Canada.33
Beside the political ramifications the venture had
on Canada, there were social indicators that might
help to put the Alaska Highway project into an even
larger context and give it a complete perspective.  The
majority of the United States army workers for this job
were black.  It is believed by some that the highway
was an attempt to separate blacks and whites because
of racial tensions in the military.  President Roosevelt
had it in mind to keep a sizeable part of black troops
in a remote area away from white troops during the
148 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      34E. Valerie Smith, “The Black Core of Engineers and the
Construction of the Alaska (ALCAN) Highway,” Negro History
Bulletin, v51, Dec, 1993: 22-37.  Expanded Academic ASAP. 
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war.34  The perfect opportunity would be in a remote
area like the Pacific Northwest.  This was one social
problem for the U.S. solved by the construction of the
Alaska Highway.
One other social problem solved during the project
was that of disconnection between Alaska and the
continental U.S. due to a lack of communication
technologies.  Theodore Strauss argued that communi-
cation was tough even for the army.  The only news
that they could receive was from Japanese and some-
times Russian radio stations.35  Alaska was without
telephone service, and could only reach the rest of the
United States through telegram.  By the end of the
war, a telephone system was constructed along the
highway, which helped to unite Alaska with the
contiguous part of the country.36  While these seem-
ingly small social implications do not add up to much
in the grand scheme of the need for a highway to
Alaska, they help to put the whole picture of its
conception into context.
Looking at the entire picture, it seems that the need
for military defense of Alaska was not the most sub-
stantial piece of the puzzle.  Bezeau would argue that
the Alaska Highway did not contribute significantly to
the defense of Alaska.37  Even during the early stages
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of the war, the military did not back a road to the
territory of Alaska.  There was no justification for it.38
The highway never even accomplished the military goal
of taking pressure off of the Aleutian Islands.  Coates
writes that the Alaska Highway lost its importance in
the scheme of the war because the Japanese threat to
Alaska fell dramatically after the initial attacks on the
Aleutian Islands.39  It makes no sense that the road
would have been built for defense reasons, when it was
not used for that purpose during World War II.
What does make sense is the Alaska Highway’s
significance to the history of the Alaskan economy.
Because of the road, tourist families from all over the
United States can more easily make the trip to Alaska.
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution ran a story on one
such family, the Coogle’s, in 1959.  The family may not
have been able to make the trip without the road, but
in 1959, they finally made the drive all the way from
Georgia to Alaska with its improved conditions for
tourists.  They had wanted to explore the adventure
that is Alaska, just as so many other families had
wanted to before the construction of the highway and
since its completion.40  Tour buses have provided
transportation to Alaska, and brought money into the
state with increased expenditure.  Even neglecting the
increase in tourism, Alaskans have been better off with
the highway because of its benefits of cheap transpor-
tation.  With the oil, seafood, and many minerals in
Alaska, exporting goods to other places has been
150 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      41Lee Huskey, “Import Substitution: The Hidden Dynamic in
the Growth of Frontier Regions,” Growth and Change, 16 (Oct
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facilitated by the highway.41  All of these products have
bolstered the Alaskan economy and have given an
extra source of useful natural resources to the conti-
nental United States.
The construction of the Alaska Highway has
provided numerous opportunities for the state of
Alaska, and from Alaska to the rest of the country.
While many point to the need for the defense of Alaska
as the primary reason for the construction of the
highway, it is clear that Japanese attacks were only
the final straw that helped the government gain
support for the project.  The economic success of
Alaska has been greatly helped by the Alaska Highway,
and the economic impact on Alaskan industries was,
as were certain political and social factors, far more
important than military defense in the motivations of
those interested in constructing the highway.  The
economy was what drove the idea of the Alaska High-
way to Congress.  The need for military defense was
just a measure used to bring those unsure of the
project to support it.
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